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1.  Introduction 
 
While the French rotating EU presidency was widely expected to 
turn its attention Southward with the launching of the “Union pour 
la Méditerranée”, it had to shift its attention Eastward with the out-
burst of the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008. This conflict 
proved to be a useful case in order to understand the functioning of 
the EU as a normative power in times of crisis, which is not sup-
posed to be its main assets because of the decentralized nature of 
the decision-making process. In this sense, the EU should be con-
ceived as “a pluralist actor composed of political and administra-
tive  elites,  as  well  as  of  interest  groups,  economic  and  non-
governmental  actors  originating  from  member  states  with  some-
times very different preferences” (Delcour, Tulmets 2008: 13).  
 
The preferences vis-à-vis Russia change both in time and space, 
they are not homogeneous at the European level neither at the na-
tional or social levels. The historical perception includes the post-
1991 period, during which Russia has been described first as the 
“sick man of Europe” in the 1990s, and then as a quasi-monolithic 
entity and resurgent power in the 2000s, but also the tsarist and as 
Soviet eras. The core of the article is focused on the six EU major 
countries – Germany, France, Great-Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain 
– which embody different set of preferences, and the way they want 
to deal with Russia. Thus, how the EU can act collectively under the 
condition of a divisive geopolitical issue with a reluctant partner 
(Russia), given its diverse preferences?  
 
Among the various positions regarding Russia and the management 
of the common neighbourhood, these preferences can be summa-
rised through two ideal-types: on the one hand, a “creeping integra-
tion” approach of Russia is suggested, trying to build interdepend-
ence between the EU and Russia. On the other hand, the relations 
can be based on a “soft containment” approach, aiming at rolling 
Russia back of the common neighbourhood. Then, beyond the de-
bate between “value” and “interest” in the EU foreign policy, the 
emphasis is put on the various preferences and the way they are 
translated into norms.  
 
 Parmentier: Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia.      51 
2.  A preference for Partnership 
 
The “creeping integration” logic aims at attracting Russia into the 
EU’s orbit through institutions and economy. It was supported by 
major  countries  in  the  EU,  such  as  Germany,  France,  Italy  and 
Spain, un-at-ease with the Russian-Georgian war.  
 
Following the founders of the EU, the three most populated count-
ries evoked do not see why the extension of the original project – 
bypassing French and German animosity through economic integra-
tion (the “spill-over effect”) would not work in the broader neigh-
bourhood. They argue that this logics remains preferably to a con-
frontationist approach, even in the energy field (after all, France and 
Germany  integrated  first  through  the  European  Coal  and  Steel 
Community just a few year after the war). For the same reason, they 
want to defend a certain political vision of the EU project, which 
supposes to carefully think about the “EU absorption capacity” be-
fore any new EU enlargement.  
 
France,  Germany  and  Italy  have  established  strong  bilateral  ties 
with Russia, notably in the energy sector – Spain remaining behind 
them. France and Russia are not major trading partners, although 
there is an emerging trend toward cooperation in the energy field, 
including Total, which signed a deal with Gazprom to develop the 
Shtokman  gas  field,  Gaz  de  France,  which  may  take  part  to  the 
Nord Stream project (after being expelled from the Nabucco pro-
ject), and even more recently EDF (with the South Stream pipeline 
project).  Traditionally,  Russia  was  thought  as  an  ideal  counter-
weight for French geopolitics, able to contain the German empire 
(before WWI, a curious alliance between French Republic and tsar-
ist system) or limit US hegemony in the Gaullist tradition (after 
WWII, especially in the times of “détente”). If President Sarkozy 
was critical against Russia during his electoral campaign (using a 
Human rights rhetoric), he has moderated his discourse while in 
power. His Prime Minister, François Fillon, publicly declared that 
Ukraine  and  Georgia’s  integration  into  NATO  is  not  the  right 
answer for the balance of power in Europe, and between Europe and 
Russia. During the IFRI-organized Evian conference in October 8
th, 
Sarkozy  expressed  his  satisfaction  over  “the  departure  of  the 
Russian  soldiers”,  completed  two  days  before  the  deadline,  and   European Political Economy Review  
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answered positively to the idea of discussing reconstruction of the 
European’s security architecture. 
 
In Russia, Germany is taken as a gateway to the EU: the two count-
ries have had very dynamic relations in economic (Germany is for 
instance the largest gas market) and political terms, even before the 
end of the Soviet Union. Recently, more than the growing Russian-
speaking community (from Jewish and German descents),
1 the en-
ergy question has taken a wide place. The Nord Stream pipeline, in-
itiated under the second Schröder government by Gazprom, E.ON 
and BASF, was carried forward by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 
spite of harsh Polish criticism. Former foreign Minister Franck Wal-
ter-Steinmeier  remained  strongly  attached  to  a  partnership  with 
Moscow, and has assured continuity in the German policy toward 
Russia.  
 
Italy, another EU founding member, has a long tradition of eco-
nomic cooperation with Russia; FIAT started an industrial collabor-
ation with VAZ–Lada in Togliatti (or Tolyatti) in the 1960s. More 
recently, the Italian multinational oil and gas company ENI (Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarburi) and Gazprom agreed in June 2007 to build 
the South Stream pipeline, linking Russia to Italy through the Black 
Sea. This project is generally considered to be more or less in com-
petition with the pipeline project Nabucco, supported by the EU in-
stitutions. Political relations have been close under left-wing (Prodi) 
as well as right-wing (Berlusconi) governments. 
 
The relations between Russia and Spain are not as important as the 
other major countries
2, notably in terms of economic relations (e.g. 
the difficulty to conclude an agreement between Repsol and Lukoil, 
two major energy groups). However, the two countries share the 
same point of view on Kosovo (i.e. on the principle of sovereignty), 
anti-terrorism, and Spain supports the idea of reforming the security 
architecture of the continent. Besides, the Euro-Russian agreement 
                                                 
1 There is a “third wave” of emigration of Russian-speakers in Germany in the 
1970s-1980s, following the first wave of the 1920s and the second wave after 
WWII. A “fourth wave” can be identified in the recent years; overall, some es-
timates up to 1,000,000 the number of Russian-speakers in Germany. 
2 Excepted the Soviet support to the Republican Army in the Spanish Civil war 
against the Franquist troops in 1936-1939. Parmentier: Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia.      53 
on  Kaliningrad  was  concluded  under  the  Spanish  presidency  of 
2002.  
 
Thus, the four countries favour a creeping integration of Russia. At 
times, they do not feel at ease with a confrontational view of Russia 
embodied by some of the “new members” – notably Poland and 
Lithuania. They sometimes see this strategy as a loss of time or as a 
not very constructive desire of revenge (although understandable to 
some extent), and even as a way to artificially increase the tensions 
on the European continent. This view is shard by Greece and Cy-
prus, who are often vocal supporters of Russia’s action.  
 
 
3.  A preference for “soft containment”  
 
The “soft containment” approach mainly sees Russia as a threat for 
EU’s interests and values; the Russian Georgian conflict is seen as 
the manifestation of a “neo-imperialist Russia”. Poland, and to a 
lesser extent Great Britain, follow this path, among others. Poland is 
probably the standard-bearer of this approach which does not follow 
a dichotomy between an ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe, since even the 
Visegrad countries are divided (Cadier 2009). Polish hostility to-
ward Russia is proverbial, based on a tumultuous common history 
dating back to the late Middle-Ages. The adhesion of Poland in the 
EU institutions coincides nearly exactly with the Ukrainian “Orange 
Revolution” of December 2004, in which Warsaw was very much 
involved. Polish observers and associations were well implanted in 
Kiev,  while  Kwasniewski  was  the  European  mediator  alongside 
with the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus and the High Repre-
sentative Javier Solana. According to local journalists, the Orange 
Revolution was the beginning of a “Polish Europe”: they mean that 
the EU neighbourhood would inevitably follow the path of Warsaw 
nearly  a  quarter  of  century  after  the  “Solidarnosc”  movement. 
However, the claimed value-driven Polish agenda for democratic 
promotion in Ukraine was mixed with an equally important interest-
driven agenda for preventing a Kiev-Moscow axis.  
 
In  fact,  establishing  a  European  “Eastern  Dimension”  constitutes 
one of the main strategic aims of Poland, before and after the en-
largement; it wants to strengthen the ENP, or rather to introduce a   European Political Economy Review  
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fundamental  difference  between  “neighbours  of  Europe”  (the 
Southern rim of the EU, or the “Mediterranean axis”) and “Euro-
pean  Neighbours”  (basically  Ukraine,  Belarus,  Moldova  and  the 
three Caucasian neighbours), which deserve a membership prospect. 
  
In that regards, recent relations between Russia and Poland should 
be analysed; they have not been easy at least since the negotiation 
of the Kaliningrad status in the early 2000s, and later the “Orange 
Revolution” in winter 2004. Nonetheless, Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov chose Warsaw to make his first trip in Europe after 
the Russian-Georgian war, on September 11
th 2008.  
 
Beyond Poland, Great Britain has also been an advocate of this ra-
ther harsh approach over the last few years. In the 19
th Century, the 
strategic rivalry between the Russian and the British empires for the 
supremacy in Central Asia was framed as the “Great Game” (or 
“Tournament  of  Shadows”  in  Russian  terminology).
3 Even  more 
relevant for our topic, Great Britain was ready to back Georgian in-
dependence  in  1921-1922,  when  the  British  saw  that  the  White 
Generals  would  not  succeed  in  restoring  a  “One  and  Indivisible 
Russia”. Hence, Prime Minister Lloyd George favoured Georgian 
independence in order to establish a Caucasian “cordon sanitaire” 
(Ogden 1988). Yet, the Russo-British relations were at time very 
good, the two countries fighting on the same side in the Napoleonic 
Wars, in World War I and II. The relations between the two count-
ries have recently been tarnished – considering the Litvinienko case, 
a former KGB agent murdered in London in 2006,
4 the revision of 
the contract of BP and Shell, the pressure on the British Council – 
even if there are about 200 000 Russians in London, including top 
billionaires.  
 
                                                 
3 According to the classical definition, the rivalry ran approximately from 1813 
(Russo-Persian Treaty) to 1907 (Anglo-Russian Convention). The Crimean war 
(1854-1856) was even an open conflict between the two countries, where the 
protection of Christians from the Ottoman empire was at stake. See Piatigorsky, 
Sapir (eds.) 2009. 
4 The U.K. has explicitly asked for the extradition of Andrey Lugovoy, a pres-
umed murderer of Litvinenko; however, Russia cannot extradite him according 
to its Constitution. Similarly, the U.K. has refused several times to extradite 
Russian political asylum seekers, such as Boris Berezovsky.  Parmentier: Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia.      55 
4.   Finding a way between mediation and sanctions 
 
So far, two main approaches have been identified: the “creeping 
integration”  and  the  “soft  containment”  ones.  These  preferences 
lead toward different sets of policies, based on norms: the creeping 
integration approach should be linked with a will to mediate the 
conflict,  while  the  preference  for  “soft  containment”  should  be 
linked with the threats of sanctions. In the following developments, 
three kinds of norms should be distinguished and put in perspective 
(Finnemore, Sikkink 1998: 891): regulative norms, which order and 
constrain behaviour; constitutive norms, which create new actors, 
identities,  interests  or  categories  of  action;  finally,  prescriptive 
norms, which refers to “oughtness”. 
 
4.1. The EU effort to mediate the conflict 
 
The EU mediation: why? 
 
The USA could not mediate the conflict for many reasons: the most 
obvious is that it has clearly sided with one actor of this conflict, 
namely  Georgia.  Its  involvement  includes  close  military  cooper-
ation with Tbilisi, and support for its NATO bid. Furthermore, the 
Kosovo  precedent,  the  US  presidential  elections  and  a  growing 
“dialectics  of  resentment”  (Chaudet,  Parmentier,  Pélopidas  2009; 
see  also  Tsygankov  2009)  between  the  USA  and  Russia  explain 
why a constructive dialogue would have been uneasy to set up. 
 
The French EU presidency was instrumental regarding the leading 
role of the Council. President Sarkozy led a mediation on August 
12
th, starting with a four-point plan, which was renegotiated in a 
sense more favourable to the Russian side, thanks to its military su-
periority on the ground. It ended up with an agreement on a six-
point peace plan: abstain from the use of force; cease hostility de-
finitively; assure free access for humanitarian assistance; Georgian 
military forces should withdraw to their usual places of deployment; 
Russian military forces should withdraw to the lines preceding the 
outbreak of hostilities; finally, opening of international discussions 
on the modalities of security and stability in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. This core agreement, criticized for not putting explicitly the 
full sovereignty of Georgia on its whole territory (i.e. including the   European Political Economy Review  
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separatist entities), constitutes the basis of the EU action, and has 
inspired the various options envisaged. 
 
The EU special representative 
 
The nomination of a EU Special Representative can be considered 
as a constitutive norm, in the sense that it its formulation and exer-
cise has the effect of highlighting a particular version of European 
identity which is constructed as a regional actor, a peace-maker. 
The EUSR represents a way to pursue a common approach in a 
puzzling area, enabling the Union to act cohesively. It enhances the 
EU position in the negotiation of the peace process. The EU has ap-
pointed in February 2006 a EUSR for South Caucasus, the Swedish 
Peter Semneby, whose role and mandate have been reinforced over 
time.  In  order  to  facilitate  confidence-building  measures,  he  has 
been endowed with a support team under the umbrella of the EU 
Rule of Law Mission to Georgia (EUJUST THEMIS). 
 
Interestingly enough, the conflict of August 2008 did not lead to the 
strengthening  of  the  current  EUSR  for  South  Caucasus,  whose 
mandate includes Georgia as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, but 
to the creation of a new EUSR. In fact, Pierre Morel, already the 
EUSR for Central Asia, was appointed on 25 September 2008. His 
mandate is different from Semneby’s one in the sense that he should 
dedicate its attention to the crisis in Georgia itself, on the basis of 
the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council meeting in 
Brussels in 1 September 2008 and the Council conclusions of 15 




Just as the EUSR, the EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mis-
sion) constitutes both a constitutive and a regulatory norm, since it 
emphasizes a specific European identity, creates a new actor and 
constrains behaviour. This temporary mission was established by 
the Council on Monday 15 September 2008 as an autonomous civil-
ian monitoring mission, under the ESDP. It tries to contribute to 
stability throughout Georgia and the surrounding region, in accord-
ance with the August six-point agreement and the subsequent im-
plementing measures.  Parmentier: Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia.      57 
The  deployment  of  more  than  three-hundred  unarmed  European 
monitors started as soon as 1 October 2008, and was quite well or-
ganised,  in  contrast  with  the  Kosovo  mission  (EULEX)  or  the 
EUPOL mission in Afghanistan. While this civilian mission looks 
relatively unimpressive compared with the Russian Army’s 76
th Air 
Assault Division, the EU observers were able to enter the buffer 
zone surrounding the separatist South Ossetia region, a move that 
was  at  the  start  opposed  by  Russia.  As  such,  the  well-planned 
EUMM shows how the EU has borrowed from the military in the 
way it operates civilian mission (Korski 2008). 
 
4.2. Sanctions and threats of sanctions 
 
Sanctions appear as prescriptive norms which define what ought to 
be. If the sanctions are undeniably coercive in essence, according to 
academic definitions of hard power, the threat of sanctions can be 
used as soft power. 
 
The Polish debate on sanctions 
 
The Polish debate is interesting in the sense that Poland has been 
the first country to evoke the possibility of sanctions among the six 
bigger states, and was reluctant from the start to back the six-point 
plan given the fact that it did not include a reference to Georgian 
sovereignty. Hence, Poland suggested tough financial and economic 
measures before the EU emergency summit on relations with Russia 
after the war in South Ossetia, held on September, 1
st 2008. Britain 
and Poland, as the main advocates of a tough line towards Russia 
proposed to postpone the negotiation of the PCA. Among others, 
the head of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Polish deputy Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, claimed that “if Russia does 
not respect its own commitments under the six-point plan, the EU 
should reconsider its negotiations” (Abdullaev, von Twickel 2008). 
However, the negotiation had already been delayed for a year and a 
half because of the position taken by such EU members as Poland 
and Lithuania, and resumed only in summer 2008. This move was 
largely symbolic, since it is not of a first-rate interest for Russian 
leaders.  
   European Political Economy Review  
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Yet,  all  political  members  were  not  in  a  hurry  to  support  Sa-
akashvili’s move to attack South Ossetia. For instance, Leszek Mil-
ler, a former Prime Minister, criticized his President Lech Kaczyn-
ski for equating Polish patriotism with anti-Russian position, and 
supporting  the  interest  of  the  Georgian  President  rather  than  the 
Georgians’  ones  (Miller  2008);  contrarily  to  Kwasniewski  in  the 
Orange Revolution, Kaczynski couldn’t manage to become a me-
diator of the crisis, because he preferred to side with Saakashvili. 
Instead, the current head of the EU, the French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy, endorsed the role of negotiator with Russia. It may be dif-
ficult  for  the  Polish  President  to  convince  far  beyond  countries 
which already share its position, since, for instance, he has alienated 
any kind of support from Germany at the diplomatic level.  
 
The efficacy of sanctions 
 
Generally, EU statements on common foreign and security policy 
put the emphasis on incentives rather than on ‘restrictive measures’ 
i.e.  ‘sanctions’.  Yet,  the  EU  sanction  policy  has  developed  over 
time, for many reasons, notably to protect its own strategic interest 
(stability  and  security)  and  to  promote  a  normative  order  in  its 
neighbourhood. Sanctions might in the end lead to negative conse-
quences for the “sender”; it may be costly for some or all member-
States.  Some  can  be  simply  useless:  an  arm  embargo  on  Russia 
would not fit its situation of great power. Boycotting the Olympic 
Games of Sochi 2014 would only be a symbolical decision. It can 
even be counterproductive in the long run: freezing Russia's appli-
cation to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would for in-
stance be counterproductive for the EU, since it aims at introducing 
Russia to the principles of international trade and to the dispute set-
tling procedures.  
 
In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  crisis  in  Georgia,  one  of  the 
fathers of the European Neighbouhood Policy, Chris Patten, looked 
sceptical  as  regards  the  possibility  to  use  sanctions:  “I  doubt 
whether anything tougher than strongly worded communiqués will 
ever be employed”  (Patten  2008),  given  that  Russian  troops  will 
stay in a truncated country for years. However, as part of ‘smart 
sanctions’,  the  Financial  Times  (22  August  2009)  suggested  to 
target influential Russian oligarchs. These billionaires may be the Parmentier: Normative Power, EU Preferences and Russia.      59 
Achilles’ heel of Kremlin politics since their goal is to run business, 
not  to  obey  to  political  objectives.  Overall,  the  use  of  sanctions 
would have been very difficult to put into practice, while the finan-
cial crisis has made them less relevant. 
 
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
The EU is considered as a normative power not only because it aims 
at exporting norms – in that sense, all major powers could be nor-
mative to some extent – but because it has to get along on legitimate 
and shared norms in order to act collectively. Its decentralized deci-
sion-making is generally thought to preclude the EU ability to act 
efficiently in the international scene. It is especially true with Rus-
sia, which confronts the EU with a series of challenges in terms of 
coherence, consistency, capacities and influence (Delcour 2008).  
 
The Russian–Georgian war has been framed as a major crisis, as the 
regional stability was threatened due to a perceived disproportionate 
use of military force. Contrarily to pessimistic views, the EU has 
been able to maintain its unity on the six-points plan, which situated 
at  the  epicentre  between  two  main  preferences  vis-à-vis  Russia: 
partnership and soft containment. The room for interpretation al-
lowed by the plan has helped to maintain the European unity on a 
highly divisive subject. Thus, the crisis in Georgia provides an in-
teresting case-study of the EU normative power, which reveals able 
to act in this difficult context. While the efficiency of the sanctions 
remained to be seen, the EU presence has been strengthened stra-
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